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PROPERTY TAX RELIEF: A VIABLE ADJUNCT
TO HOUSING POLICY?
DENNIS L. WITTMAN*
The object of this paper is to explore the desirability and practical-
ity of a real property tax rebate system to aid low-income families.
Borrowing heavily from a Wisconsin statute1 providing such tax relief
to the elderly, the influential Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations (ACIR) has proposed "suggested legislation"2 to
reduce housing costs for low-income groups through a property tax
rebate. This paper will attempt to evaluate the need for such a rebate
scheme and whether the ACIR proposal meets that need. Some con-
dusions also will be drawn concerning the implications of implement-
ing state legislation along the lines of the ACIR proposal.
INTRODUCTION
Amid the clamor that has arisen in the last decade for increasing
and improving the nation's housing stock, property taxes have re-
mained one housing-related cost that local and state officials have
largely not considered when seeking to aid low-income families in ob-
taining better shelter. For a long time it has been recognized that the
tax on real property places a heavy burden upon those groups living
on a low or fixed income.3 Yet there has been a reluctance to consider
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1965; J.D., Washington University, 1971.
I. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
Minnesota has a similar rebate scheme. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 290.0601-0617
(Supp. 1971). Vermont has a statute with a similar purpose, but because of a
wholly different scheme of computation, is not considered here. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5961-75 (1969). Since the Minnesota scheme is so similar to
Wisconsin's, it will not be considered in detail in this paper.
2. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1970 CuMuLA-
TIVE ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 15-62-48 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM].
3. For a concise history of the property tax and its weaknesses as a source of
revenue in the United States see G. BENSON, S. BENSON, H. MCCLELLAND, & P.
THOmSON, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAx: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT 11-82 (1965) [hereinafter cited as THE AMERICAN PROPERTY
TAX3. Useful bibliographies covering various aspects of the property tax may be
found in TAx INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND Po-
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seriously methods that might ease that burden. There has been, of
course, a wave of homestead exemption laws enacted since the 19301S. 4
These statutes are responses by state legislatures to the popular de-
mand for relief for those families, usually elderly couples, who have
considerable assets in real property but little or no income from which
to pay taxes.5 The homestead statutes, however, are uneven in their
relief since they meet only the needs of property owners, ignoring the
vast number of poor renters, and they usually must be available to all,
regardless of income. They also erode the local tax base.6 As a result
they cannot be widely expanded. Real property taxes, therefore, con-
tinue to impose a heavy burden on poor renters and owner-occupants.
Furthermore, there has been a growing recognition that, viewed as a
consumption tax, the real property tax has a debilitating effect on
attempts to improve the overall housing stock.
It would seem then that certain adjustments in property taxes might
be an advantageous method not only of lifting some of the tax burden
falling on the poor, but also of contributing toward improvement of
housing in general. The chief argument for such property tax manip-
ulation is that the tax is one of the few housing costs over which state
and local governmental units may have some leverage. Land values,
interest rates, labor costs, and other items all may be beyond the
effective control of government, but real property taxes can be changed
by legislation and thus are directly affected by public policy.8 The
reason that there has been reluctance to touch the property tax is that
the tax is a bulwark in the revenue structure of most local govern-
ments.9 Municipalities and counties must have it to remain financially
free of the state and the federal governments 1 0
TENTIALS 461-85 (1967), and in Council of Planning Librarians, Exchange Bib-
liography No. 172 (Vance ed. 1971-available from P.O. Box 229, Monticello,
Ill., 61856).
4. See Yung-Ping, Present Status and Fiscal Significance of Property Tax Ex-
emptions for the Aged, 18 NAT. TAx J. 162 (1965).
5. Id. In other words, there are some low-income families who are "property
rich but income poor." Quindry & Cook, Humanization of the Property Tax for
Low Income Households, 22 NAT. TAX J. 357, 359 (1969).
6. See ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 15-62-48.
7. See, e.g., D. NETZER, IMPACT OF THE PROPERTY TAX: ITS ECONOMIC Ir-
PLICATIONS FOR URBAN PROBLEMS, JOINT COsI. PRINT, 9 0TH Cong., 2d Sess.
18-45 (National Comm'n on Urban Problems Report to Joint Economic Comm.,
1968) [hereinafter cited as NETzER-DOUGLAS COMZ?,'N RPT.].
8. W. MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION 37 (1955).
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
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Despite its harmful impact on the poor-and this is only one of many
complaints against the tax"-the real property tax still is a necessary
source of revenue for local governments. How the ACIR proposal
mentioned earlier might solve this problem will be considered below,
but first it is necessary to evaluate the need for property tax relief by
refining the nature of the harmful impact which the real property tax
has upon housing consumption.
THE DESIRABILITY OF PROPERTY TAX RELIEF
Although the term "property tax" in one sense refers to a broad
category of excises on all kinds of property-real, personal, tangible,
and intangible-in the United States today the term seems to connote
the tax on residential and commercial real property, and appurte-
nances thereto, levied on the basis of assessed valuation by local gov-
ernmental units, especially municipalities or counties. It is with this
latter connotation of the tax as a levy on real property that this paper
is concerned.
The taxation of real property is still one of the greatest sources of
revenue for local governmental units. During the first third of this
century many economists predicted that general property taxation
would permanently decline as a source of revenue because of problems
of administration arising in the shift in wealth from land holding to
ownership in intangibles and personalty.' 2 The growth of sales and
personal income taxes as well as pressure from real property taxpayers
to ease their burden during the Great Depression reduced the reliance
that state and local governments placed on the property tax.' 3 Since
11. For the problems of modem property tax administration see A. LYNN, JR.,
THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1969). Detailed criticisms also
may be found in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS
AND POTENTIALS (1967) and in THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX.
12. THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX at 58-59, 72. The shift caused much tax
fraud and subsequent loss of revenue, which eventually forced some states to forego
altogether taxes on intangibles so that there is no such tax in 11 of the 23 states
with the largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the 1960 Census. Of
the 47 states with SMSA's in the 1960 Census, 20 had no property tax on intan-
gibles. NETZER-DOUGLAS COMM'N RPT. at 5.
13. THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX at 72. See also Groves, Property Tax-
Effects and Limitations, in THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 17-18
(1967), wherein it is stated:
The tax did not perform well during the Great Depression when it was em-
barrassed by tax delinquencies, rate limitations, and tax revolts of one sort or
another. This was the time when taxpayers took legislators by the scruff of
the neck figuratively and literally and told them to find something to tax
besides real estate. This was the period of wholesale enactment of state sales
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World War II, however, "the property tax has ceased its relative de-
cline."14 By 1962 the property tax composed more than 11 per cent of
total federal-state-local revenues and almost 3J per cent of the gross
national product. 5 Today, the property tax can be fairly described as
primarily a levy on real estate because . . . locally assessed real
property made up 76.3% of total assessed valuation subject to
taxation in 1961. And it is chiefly a local tax: locally assessed
property of all types represented 92.2% of all assessed valuation in
1961.16
Perhaps more to the point, the property tax today is to a large extent
a tax on housing. Dick Netzer, professor of public finance at the New
York University Graduate School of Public Administration and a
recognized authority on the property tax, has estimated that roughly
one-half of all property tax revenue raised in 1962 in the 1960 U. S.
Census's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) "was derived
from taxes on housing.... ,,11
and/or income taxes; many municipalities, particularly cities, similarly
broadened the local tax base. Meanwhile the federal government had adopted
its income tax and developed it into the backbone of a vastly expanded rev-
enue system. Along with it went a satellite levy on payrolls to finance social
security. The property tax which had supplied 55.5 per cent of overall tax
revenues as late as 1932 sank to 13.2 per cent in 1955.
14, THE AmERIGAN PROPERTY TAx at 72.
15. Id. "[S]ince World War II the tax . . . appears easily able to . . . (keep]
pace with the growth of the gross national product .... ." Id. at 13. The revival
of the property tax as a source of revenue has been explained this way:
Perhaps the outstanding feature of the recent behavior of the property tax is
the way in which in the past decade its revenues have kept pace with increases
in state-local expenditure and thus its decline in relative importance has been
arrested. Although the evidence is inconclusive, it does appear that part of
the reason for this behavior is that the economic base of the property tax-
the market value of taxable types of property-has been extremely responsive
to growth in national output in the postwar period, an apparent interruption
to the long decline in capital-output ratios. In any event property tax
revenues have exhibited a responsiveness or "GNP elasticity" iar higher than
earlier expectation.
D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAx 8-9 (1966) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter cited as EcoNoMIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAx].
,16. THE AmERICAN PROPERTY TAx at 72-73.
17. NETZER-DoUGLAS Coanx'N RPT. at 12-14 (note especially tables 6, 7, & 8).
See also EcoNoMIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAx, where it is noted:
Property classes which are especially urban in character-notably housing and
commercial realty, such as stores and office buildings-appear to produce
more revenue than their shares of assessed values would suggest. This is to be
expected since property tax rates are higher in urban areas than in rural areas;
the farm realty share of tax revenue is appreciably lower than its share of
assessed values.
Id. at 19. The estimate of a 50 per cent share of total property tax revenue gen-
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Since housing composes such a large segment of the overall property
tax base, it is obvious that the tax has serious consequences which
must be evaluated in examining problems of housing policy. But
gauging exactly what those consequences are has been very difficult for
economists and taxation authorities. For instance, the traditional com-
plaint has been that the property tax is highly regressive in its distribu-
tion-that its application imposes a proportionately heavier tax burden
on those in lower-income brackets.18 Yet the late Harold M. Groves,
a University of Wisconsin economist and authority on the property
tax, said that "regressivity is hardly the most impressive charge that
can be laid against the property tax."' Examining the tax from a
long-range point of view, Groves said:
At any one time there are many people over-housed and under-
housed, so to speak, because they have not yet adjusted their
housing expense to their incomes, up or down. The new evidence
poses the possibility that for income classes of lifetime income,
differences in burden over most of the income scale may pretty
well average out.20
And Professor Netzer has observed that, "considered in the aggregate
.... the tax has positive advantages on distributional and efficiency
crated by housing was figured this way:
Since 1957, housing has increased substantially as a proportion of assessed
values for general property taxation, while acreage and farm property have
declined; so have state assessed property and locally assessed personalty.
Meanwhile, both nominal and effective property tax rates have risen; quite
evidently this rise has been largest in urban areas and therefore on urban-type
properties. In all probability, therefore, very close to 50 per cent of total
property tax revenues is now collected from nonfarm households, about 40
per cent from nonfarm businesses, and less than 8 per cent from agriculture.
Id. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted).
18. According to Professor Netzer, the traditional complaint followed this form:
[T]he property tax worked out in practice to be quite regressive in incidence;
that is, the tax as a percentage of the incomes of those who bear the ulti-
mate burden declines as income rises. Other critics supported the regressivity
argument with empirical evidence, and found that the incidence of the tax
was not only regressive but also poorly related to the benefits received from
public expenditure financed by the property tax. Yet another shortcoming
was considered to be the tax's discouragement of investment in that social
necessity, housing.
EcoNoMIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAx at 5 (footnotes omitted). Detailed discussion
of some of the more technical reasons for property tax regressivity may be found
in id. at 56-57.
19. Groves, Property Tax-Effects and Limitations, in THE PROPERTY TAx:
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 17, 20 (1967).
20. Id. The "newer evidence" to which Professor Groves refers may be found
in EcoNomxics OF THE PROPERTY TAx at 55-66.
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grounds."21 Netzer has explained that the tax contains "a large meas-
ure of 'vertical equity' [in that] ... it redistributes income from the
rich to the poor."22 The "vertical equity" occurs
because the tax itself is more or less proportional in its incidence
among income groups, but the expenditures it finances are heavily
"pro-poor" in their incidence. The property tax in the aggregate
also tends to increase the application of resources to high return
human investment and may deter somewhat lower return invest-
ment in physical capital.23
Groves and Netzer were, of course, talking in long-range, theoretical
terms that, to the satisfaction of an economist's model, do minimize
the regressivity of the tax. But both Groves and Netzer have recog-
nized the short-run regressivity that is particularly burdensome to the
poor as well as detrimental to the immediate improvement of housing
for low-income groups, especially renters.24 Netzer has explained the
21. EcoNomics OF THE PROPERTY TAX at 164.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 164-65. A more detailed discussion, placed in the context of inci-
dence by income class, may be found in EcoNoMIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAX at 42,
The shift to "high return human investment" is also given detailed consideration.
Id. at 67-69.
24. For instance, Groves noted:
According to the 1960 census of housing there were 1,669,000 families living
in substandard or deteriorating housing, although they devoted 35 per cent
or more of their income to rent.
Groves, Property Tax-Effects and Limitations, in THE PROPERTY TAx:. PROB-
LEMS AND POTENTIALS 17, 21 (1967). Netzer made this comment on regressivity
and renters:
Rather good evidence on incidence by income class of property taxes on
owner-occupied houses strongly indicates that this component of the tax is
even more regressive than the nonresidential component. Somewhat less di-
rect evidence indicates that the tax on rented housing is still more regressive.
However, because renters tend to be poorer and decidedly smaller consumers
of housing (and hence pay less property tax, via rents) when the two series
are combined, the picture is less clear.
EcONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX at 40 (footnotes omitted). Since the publica-
tion of the above two comments, the following statistical data was reported:
The Law of Diminishing Returns has been overtaking private rental housing
for years, even in the moderate income housing market.
In 1966, average rent per room per month ranged from $22 in the South to
$49.50 in the West.... U.S.A. averages were $46.50 for elevator apartments,
$26.50 for low rise buildings with 12-14 units, $30.50 for low rise buildings
with 25 or more units, and $25.60 for garden type apartments. But only
43.1 per cent of gross possible income (GPI) for the large low rise a part-
ments remained after expenses to cover debt service, depreciation, and re-
turn on investmnt. The corresponding figure for elevator buildings was 48.3
per cent and for garden type apartments, 49.5 per cent. (Debt service alone
took, 58.7 per cent of the monthly housing expense of the FHA 203 new
homeowners in 1966.)
Real estate taxes, up 9.2% since 1966, in 1966 took 15.7% of GPI from pri-
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burden and detriment by analogizing the property tax on housing to
general sales and selective excise taxes like those on tobacco and alco-
hol, all of which are known as "consumption taxes." 25 "[V]iewed as an
excise tax and leaving aside all benefit considerations, [the property tax
on housing] is higher in rate than any other generally used American
consumption tax, except taxes on liquor, tobacco, and gasoline,"
Netzer has remarked .2  Like other consumption taxes, "the great bulk
of the burden of the housing property tax appears to rest upon hous-
ing consumers, whether they are owner-occupants or tenants.."27 Netzer
estimates that nationally "probably well over 90 per cent of all prop-
erty taxes on housing are borne by housing occupants.."28 By 1960, 3.6
million households nationally were subject to property tax rates
equivalent to 20 per cent of housing expenses, and 1.2 million "were
subject to rates in excess of 33.3 per cent."29 Netzer has calculated
that, excluding liquor, tobacco, and gasoline, "all the indirect taxes
which fall upon consumers-including shifted business taxes as well as
ordinary sales and excise taxes-probably amount to less than 10 per
cent of nonhousing consumer expenditures-less than half the level
of housing taxation." a The 1968 Kaiser Report2 ' stated that property
taxes account for a "large proportion of a family's monthly housing
costs ...[representing] 26% of monthly shelter costs in moderately
priced single family housing, and 14% in elevator apartment units."32
The Kaiser Report observed that "[]ocal real estate taxes are widely
considered to have the effect of disturbing the operation of housing
vately owned rental elevator buildings, an average of 16.6% from low rise
apartments, and 13.3% from garden type apartments. Also, as a percentage
of gross possible income, payrolls range from 6.3% on the smaller low rise
apartments to 8.4% on elevator buildings. Loss from vacancies and delin-
quent rents in the area of 4% to 5%. Maintenance and repairs account for
4.3% to 6.3% and management for 4.3% to 5.2%.
The long lag in rent rises and the sharp increase in real estate taxes are put-
ting increasing pressure on rental rates.
E. EAVES, HOW THE MANY COSTS OF HOUSING FIT TOGETHER, NATIONAL COMAM'N
ON URBAN PROBLEMS RPT. No. 16, 8 (1969) (emphasis added).
25. NETZER-DOUGLAS COMMi'N RPT. at 16.
26. ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAx at 30.
27. NETZER-DOUGLAS COMM'N RPT. at 16. Professor Netzer notes as one
"chief" exception that "owners of rental property cannot shift the burden of that
portion of the tax which falls on the land underlying their buildings." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 18.
31. PRESMENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HoUSING, A DECENT Ho sE (1968).
32. Id. at 99.
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markets by discouraging consumption of housing."33 Netzer under-
scored the problem more forcefully this way:
It is simply inconceivable that, if we were starting to develop a
tax system from scratch, we would single out housing for extraor-
dinarily high levels of consumption taxation. More likely, we
would exempt housing entirely from taxation, just as many States
exempt food from the sales tax.34
This heavy taxation discourages "consumption of and investment
in housing in general by the entire population."3 s But the discourage-
ment is most likely to fall hardest on the central city as opposed to
the suburbs, because, unlike the central city, "the property tax in
many suburbs is analogous to a general charge for the use of public
services."'3 Because central cities provide a wide variety of services
33. Id.
34. NETZER-DouGLAs Couu'N RPT. at 16.
35. Id. at 19. A second discouraging effect is explained this way:
There is ample evidence that consumers will buy more and better housing if
its price is lower, just as they do with regard to most other objects of con-
sumption. It can be and has been argued persuasively that one of the most
effective ways of helping the low-income population (with respect to housing)
is to rapidly increase the total supply of housing in a particular city and
metropolitan area; a decrease in prices (rents), while having no immediate
effect on total housing supply, does create a larger effective housing market
for those who now suddenly can afford more of the existing housing. The
evidence from the 1950's strongly suggests that the housing conditions of the
poor improved most radically in those areas in which the total supply of
housing rose most rapidly. The process by which this occurs is related to the
rate of turnover of housing ....
Id. at 19-20.
36. Id. at 21-22. This is explained by the fact that in "suburban communities,
particularly bedroom suburbs, the public services that a family receives or has
access to are very closely tied to the local taxes that same family pays." Id. at 21.
Netzer describes this as similar to an income tax in its effect and concludes that it
is "unlikely to be a deterrent to consumption of housing; that is, to the expenditure
of consumer income for housing." Id. at 22. The deterrent effect of property
taxes for suburbanites may be further weakened by other factors, as Netzer ex-
plains:
Perhaps the biggest single type of quality upgrading which occurs in the
housing market is the shift from rented to owner-occupied housing. Since
high property taxes on housing are far more apparent to present or prospec-
tive owner occupants than to renters, the short-term deterrent effects of in-
creased property taxes should be particularly important in this regard. How-
ever, there has clearly been a vast amount of this type of upgrading in the
past twenty years in the face of high and rising property taxes. One ex-
planation of this apparent anomaly lies in the many offsetting factors at work
in this same period: the liberalization of mortgage terms; the inflation hedge
aspect of investment in housing (or in other real property) ; the advantageous
income tax treatment of home ownership for better off families; and, for
apartment housing and non-residential construction, the favorable deprecia-
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and tax a wider variety of property, "individuals cannot reasonably
assume that the prices of housing confronting them include an identi-
fiable tax component which is in effect a charge for a preferred pack-
age of public services."37 This translates into discouraging those fam-
ilies financially able to choose their home location from selecting a
central city site, thereby hastening the middle-class flight to the sub-
urbs and more effectively isolating the poor.38 It also dampens the
tion/capital gains treatment of real estate investment under the federal income
tax, especially since 1954.
ECONOMICS OF TYE PRoPzRTY TAx at 73-74. For a different look at the charac-
terization of the property tax in the suburbs as a "benefit tax" see J. HEiLBRuN,
REAL ESTATE TAXES AND UR3AN HouSING 156-62 (1966).
37. NETZER-DOUGLAS CoMm'N RPT. at 22. There is a trend toward giving
more favorable tax treatment to property improvements in central cities in order
to preserve housing in still healthy neighborhoods, preserve existing housing stock,
and improve housing overall. Id. at 21. On the "wide variety of services" central
cities provide, Netzer notes that:
For many years-in fact, ever since there have been suburban populations
living beyond central city boundaries but economically tied to the city
---central city governments have been faced with problems arising from the
concentration of needs for public services within their jurisdictions. They
have, throughout this period, provided a variety of services on behalf of their
entire urbanized areas. The poor and the disadvantaged tend to cluster down-
town, giving rise to high welfare, health, educational, and similar expendi-
tures. Moreover, many specialized services have been provided only by central
city governments simply because only the central city had the size necessary
to support activities with markedly increasing returns to scale, many of them
"natural monopolies," ranging from water supply to zoos.
EcoNoMIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAX at 116. Evidence that the central cities can
no longer provide these "natural monoplies" without support from suburban tax-
payers was provided in St. Louis recently. St. Louis County taxpayers were asked
to approve a special tax district to support the St. Louis zoo, art museum, and
museum of science and natural history. The tax district was approved, but just
barely. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 7, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
38. NETZER-DOUGLAS COMM'N RPr. at 22. Netzer points out that taxes might
even be higher in the suburbs than in the central city, but the advantages the
suburban taxpayers get may be more visible to them so that the taxes do not
"seem" so expensive. Id. The ultimate solution of the central city tax problem
probably is in moving away from relying on real property taxes, as one observer
has suggested:
Tlhe anomalies in the structure and operation of the property tax in an
environment of governmental fragmentation are hardly more serious than
those traceable to the whole process of urban decentralization and the result-
ing cleavage between the big city and its suburbs. The outlying communities
gain the higher income families, while the poorer underprivileged remain
behind in the core city, and the suburbs fall heir to the costly increments to
the community's capital while the city's physical plant steadily deteriorates
or falls victim to the wrecker's ball. Thus, forces at work to influence the
income side of the public ledger to a marked degree are at odds with those
impinging on the expenditure side. Here again the tax cost/tax resources re-
lationship is exposed to heavy strain, and in this case the corrective seems
Washington University Open Scholarship
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interest that many property owners might otherwise have in improv-
ing, modernizing, or rehabilitating their central city property, since,
in many cities, such activities will lead to some increase in assess-
ments.3 9 For the poor, there is little that can be foregone in order to
spend more on rent, so that whatever rehabilitated housing there
might be is effectively beyond their reach.40 Those few low-income
families that own a home in the inner city often are forced to let their
property become dilapidated.4'
to clearly lie in the direction of increasing resort to nonproperty tax financing,
for the prospect of merger as a remedy must be regarded as unlikely, at the
least.
Stiles, Some Possibilities for Meeting Property Tax Problems Arising from Multi-
plicity of Governmental Units, in THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTrN-
TIALS 417, 425-26 (1967).
39. NvTZER-DOUGLAS Co m'N Rpr. at 21. This is assuming, of course, that
the property owner could pay for or finance the improvements; that is a big as-
sumption in view of the attitude of many banks toward loans for inner-city home
improvements. Id. For some other interesting comments on the property tax and
its effect on urban renewal see ECoNoMICs OF THE PROPERTY TAx at 83-85. The
Kaiser Report came out strongly for a policy on the part of the cities to remove
the property tax as a deterrent to good maintenance and rehabilitation by assess-
ing property on the basis of its earning ability as measured by annual gross rent.
PRESIDENT'S COmmITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 103-04 (1968).
40. NETZER-DouGLAs Comm'N RsT. at 19. An interesting treatment of the
subject of central city taxes and rehabilitation is J. HEILBRUN, REAL ESTATE
TAXES AND URBAN HOUSING (1966).
41. NETZER-DOUGLAS Comm'N RPT. at 29. According to Netzer the property
tax has the following effects on urban housing and development:
1. The tax amounts to a very high consumption tax on housing expenditure
and thus tends to reduce consumer demand for housing. This in turn tends
to limit growth in the stock of urban housing and to limit improvements in
the quality of the existing housing stock.
2. These effects are not likely to be very evident in suburban communities,
especially the better-off ones, for two reasons. First, the connection between
property tax payments and local public services provided homowners is a
clear one in most suburbs. Second, the Federal income tax advantages of
homeownership, for relatively well-off taxpayers, offset the property tax in
large measure.
3. However, the deterrent effect of high taxes on consumption of, and invest-
ment in, housing in large central cities are serious. This is likely to be more
true for tenants than for homeowners, and more so for lower income groups.
For upper income groups, the outcome may be marginal encouragement to
the observed trends toward suburban residential locations; for the poor the
outcome will be less and poorer housing.
Id. An interesting theoretical observation along these lines may be found in Har-
riss, Property Taxes: Outlook and Effects, in THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS
AND POTENTIaLS 28 (1967). Harriss points out that the property tax may lead
to smaller room size in residential construction because it increases the cost of
housing-"the higher the price, the smaller the quantity purchased." Id. at 35-36.
Netzer has cited the following as "obvious and frequent criticisms" of the property
tax that are crucial for housing consumers:
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From the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that, viewed as a
consumer tax, the property tax adds a harmful cost to the price the
poor must pay for housing. Not only does the property tax add to cost
so as to make certain kinds of housing inaccessible to low-income
groups, it also frequently leaves what housing is available in a de-
plorable state of repair. Furthermore, the poor may have to pay a
greater percentage of their annual income for this deteriorated housing
than higher-income groups pay for considerably better shelter; and,
of the overall exorbitant price for housing which the poor pay, a con-
siderable percentage is directly or indirectly attributable to property
taxes. Obviously, this makes the property tax in the short run highly
regressive for all low-income groups. This is so even though, as Netzer
has noted, the property tax is as good an income distributor as some
other forms of state taxation-e.g., general sales, selective sales, and
business taxes. 2 And even though it is in the aggregate fairly pro-
portional to income throughout the country, the property tax absorbs
a high percentage of the income of the poor.43
Statistically, these statements can be heavily documented, but some
selective figures should suffice to make the desired point. For instance,
in the Newark, New Jersey, area in 1960, property taxes on residential
property amounted to from 1.8 to 5 per cent of total resident income.44
The tax may redistribute income in a desired direction, but it does this with
great unevenness, both among and within tax jurisdictions. It is, in many
metropolitan areas, regressive as between high income and low income gov-
ernmental units.
[.. The tax . . . is defective from the standpoint of horizontal equity,
"equal treatment of equals .. " [This is so because] . . . gross inequalities
in assessments relative to property value are the rule rather than the excep-
tion.... [and] either because of tastes or circumstances, consumption patterns
vary widely among individuals with similar incomes. This affects taxes on
both housing and non-residential property. Within narrow income groups,
housing consumption is quite variable; for example, in metropolitan areas in
1960, the coefficient of variation of house values for single-family homeowners
with incomes of $6,000-$7,000 (the median range) was over .50. As a con-
sequence of this, plus geographic differentials and assessment practices, real
estate taxes as a proportion of income vary widely within income classes; in
the 1960 Census of Housing, for homeowners in the $3,000-$5,000 range, 37
percent paid real estate taxes equal to less than 2 percent of income, 30
percent paid taxes equal to from 2 percent to 4 percent of income, and 33
percent paid taxes equal to more than 4 percent of income ....
EcoowIics OF THE PROPERTY TAX at 165-66 (footnotes omitted).
42. NETZER-DouoLAs COMM'N RPT. at 31. The most progressive of all state
taxes is, of course, the personal income tax. Id.
43. Id.
44. Pickard, Evaluating Tax Concessions for Urban Renewal, in THE PROP-
ERTY TiuX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 295, 298 (1967).
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In the inner city of Newark, the rate was 5 per cent, while in the
wealthiest suburb, with a median family income of $21,500, the figure
was 3.5 per cent.45 In one suburb with a 5 per cent rate, the family
income median was twice that of Newark proper.46 Furthermore, if
income is suddenly reduced for any reason such as retirement, un-
employment, sickness, or disability, the property tax may quickly
become a great burden. For instance, in Wisconsin in the early 1960's
it was discovered that 841 households headed by elderly retired per-
sons paid an average of 55 per cent of their total money income in
local property taxes. 47 Five thousand paid more than 20 per cent of
their money income in property taxes.48
The two reasons usually offered to justify this incidence of regres-
sivity are (1) that the regressiveness of the property tax is offset by a
progressive income tax policy at the federal level; and (2) that the
poor are often the primary beneficiaries of the public expenditures
which the property tax finances.49 But Netzer has said that this rea-
soning is "surely nonsense" 50 since it puts the central cities "in the
position of taxing the poor to provide services for the poor.",;1 One
report has stated forecfully: "An affluent society is under obligation to
so arrange its public finances that it is able to finance public services
without forcing low income households through the property tax
wringer."52 And it has been observed that the "offset" justification is
sound only if
there is both a high degree of congruity between Federal, State,
and local tax policies and between tax burden and expenditure
outlay patterns. A close look at the real world clearly reveals that
congruence is more apparent than real. The elderly lady living
on a $1,500 pension and paying a $300 tax on her residence, most
of which goes for public education, can hardly take comfort in
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1 FISCAL
BALANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 124 (1967). See also Cook, Quin-
dry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The Wisconsin Experience, 19 NAT.
TAx J. 319 (1966).
48. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, I FISCAL
BALANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 124 (1967).
49. Id. at 130.
50. NETZER-DOUGLAS COMm'N RPT. at 32.
51. Id.
52. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1 FISCAL
BALANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 128 (1967).
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this form of tax-benefit logic-or in the fact that the rich are re-
quired to turn over a substantial percentage of their income to
e Federal income tax collector. 5 3
Along these lines, noting that welfare and health services absorb about
ten per cent of total property tax revenues (probably more in the
central cities), Netzer argues that:
A good case can be made for relieving the property tax of the job
of financing all public services linked to the existence of poverty.
Since this burden if [sic] concentrated in central cities, it would
alleviate the central city-suburban disparities and the property
tax problems these create; it would also alleviate the regressivity
problem in the sense of taxing the poor for services to the poor.5 4
The apparent degree of regressivity and the comparatively high
consumer tax that the property tax represents, as well as the ludicrous-
ness of taxing the poor to provide them with public welfare services,
all would seem to be solid evidence that the property tax is unduly
burdensome to low-income groups. Therefore, to restore some degree
of equity to real property taxes, which historically were assumed to be
equitable, 5 relief of the extraordinary burden of property taxes would
seem justifiable. This is not to suggest, as Netzer has, that the poor
should not have to help carry any portion of the property tax load,
but only that they should not have to absorb an "inordinate" por-
tion.5 6
But even if ideally justifiable, there remains the question of the
appropriate form that property tax relief should take.57 Certainly any
53. Id. at 130.
54. NETzER-DOUGLAS CoMM'x RPT. at 37. See also Netzer, Some Alterna-
tives in Property Tax Reform, in THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS
386 (1967).
55. See J. HEMBRUN, REAL ESTATE TAXES AND URBAN HOUSING 156-57(1966).
56. Professor Groves has stressed the point that the poor should not be relieved
of all tax burdens; he has noted that where there is hardship, the welfare depart-
ment is available, but he does come out strongly for relieving the "extraordinary
burden." See Cook, Quindry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The Wis-
consin Experience, 19 NAT. TAx J. 319 (1966).
57. The argument for proceeding with caution in this field of reform is well-
stated:
Much of the widespread concern with the property tax is perhaps generated
by an increasing awareness of hardship cases on the part of citizens. Property
owners with fixed or sharply reduced income flows offer the strongest argu-
ment for property tax relief. There has been a proliferation of proposals to
grant property tax concessions to special groups, such as homeowners, farmers,
and the elderly; and to special classes of property such as new industries,
urban renewal, and open space property. Such exemptions and special treat-
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relief of the extraordinary tax burden of the poor that merely shifts
the burden to other income groups, thereby making their tax bills
more oppressive, is not a sound social and economic goal. Addi-
tionally, it does not make much sense to adopt relief that greatly com-
plicates the administration of the tax. But if the tax burden on low-
income groups is so severe as to cause undue hardship-e.g., trapping
families in rundown dwellings or forcing the elderly to choose between
lifelong homes and near-starvation-then some adjustment of the
property tax system certainly should be considered.
PRACTICALITY OF PROPERTY TAX RELIEF THROUGH REBATES
Now that the desirability of real property tax relief for low-income
groups has been made somewhat apparent, the ACIR proposed legis-
lation-essentially a model act-can be evaluated. The best approach
is to explore the history, operation, and impact of the Wisconsin
statute, mentioned earlier, which provides property tax rebates to the
elderly.5 8 The Wisconsin statute is a widely acclaimedG9 pioneering
device, the beneficial impact of which has been sufficiently docu-
mented 0 so that it is obvious why the ACIR fashioned its relief pro-
posal using the Wisconsin law as a model. The Wisconsin statute
solves several problems that other kinds of property tax relief, espe-
cially homestead exemptions, have overlooked. It focuses on the seg-
ment of the elderly most in need of relief, because its computation
formula effectively operates only for those households with income 1
ment increase the tax burdens on the rest of the community and, if allowed
to multiply, can make their burdens oppressive. In addition, they greatly
complicate the administration of the tax. In view of both the fiscal and ad-
ministrative effects of property tax exemptions, it is time to take a long hard
look at this increasing trend.
The much discussed use of the property tax to achieve social and economic
ends, such as to encourage development or to prevent urban sprawl, needs
more analytical study than it has had to date.
Back, The Property Tax Today, in THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTEN-
TIALS 2-3 (1967).
58. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Stocker, Property Tax Exemption for Farmers and the Aged, in
THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 283 (1967).
60. See Cook, Quindry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The Wisconsin
Experience, 19 NAT. TAX J. 319 (1966); Cook & Quindry, Humanization of the
Property Tax for Low Income Households, 22 NAT. TAX J. 357 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Humanization of the Property Tax].
61. The statutory definition of income says:
1. "Income" means the sum of adjusted gross income . . . , net income from
sources outside the state, alimony, support money, cash public assistance and
relief (not including relief granted under this subsection), the gross amount
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less than $3,500.62 It covers not only owner-occupants but also renters
by permitting the latter to write off 25 per cent of the gross annual
rent as "rent constituting property taxes accrued."63 And it is designed
not to erode the local tax base, because rebates are taken as credits
against state income tax liability."4 Where a daimant's rebate exceeds
state income tax liability, a cash payment for the excess amount is
paid from the state treasury. 5 Since the Wisconsin statute has been so
successful 66 in easing the tax burden for a limited group, the elderly,
without overlooking associated problems, it is natural to borrow from
it, as the ACIR has, when proposing expanded property tax relief for
all low-income groups, regardless of age,67 and to go even beyond the
ACIR proposal in granting rebates to qualifying public housing
tenants.
How does the Wisconsin statute operate? To be eligible for prop-
of any pension or annuity (including railroad retirement benefits, all pay-
ments received under the federal social security act and veterans disability
pensions), nontaxable interest received from the federal government or any of
its instrumentalities, workmen's compensation and the gross amount of "loss
of time" insurance. It does not include gifts from nongovernmental sources,
or surplus food or other relief in kind supplied by a governmental agency.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (a) (1) (1969).
62. Humanization of the Property Tax at 358-59.
63. The applicable sections of the statute are Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (a)
(6)-(7) (1969), which state:
6. "Rent constituting property taxes accrued" means 25% of the gross
rent actually paid in cash or its equivalent in 1964 or any subsequent calen-
dar year by a claimant and his household solely for the right of occupancy
of their Wisconsin homestead in such calendar year, and which rent constitutes
the basis, in the succeeding calendar year of a claim for relief under this
section by such claimant.
7. "Gross rent" means rental paid at arms-length, solely for the right of
occupancy of a homestead, exclusive of charges for any utilities, services,
furniture, furnishings or personal property appliances furnished by the land-
lord as a part of the rental agreement, whether expressly set out in the rental
agreement or not. In any case in which the landlord and tenant have not
dealt with each other at arms-length and the department is satisfied that the
gross rent charged was excessive, the department may adjust such gross rent
to a reasonable amount for purposes of this subsection. "Gross rent" includes
the space rental paid to a landlord for parking of a mobile home, exclusive
of any charges for utilities, services, furniture and furnishings or personal
appliances furnished by the landlord as a part of the space rental. Twenty-
five per cent of such annual gross rental plus the monthly parking permit fees
paid during the year shall be the annual "property taxes accrued."
64. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7)(c) (1969).
65. Id.
66. See Humanization of the Property Tax at 360-61.
67. See 1970 ACIR STATE LEGISLATiVE PRooRAm § 15-62-48.
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erty tax relief, the claimant must be more than 65 years old.08 If he
does not live alone, there can be only one claimant from his house-
hold.69 But rather than tying the relief to the income of the individ-
ual claimant, all the income of those persons composing the household
is included in "household income,"70 which is the amount used to
calculate the rebate. Essentially, then, the claimant is a household,
whether composed of one individual, an elderly married couple, or
two or more elderly persons sharing housing expenses by living in the
same dwelling. To assure that the rebate does not become a windfall,
the statute requires that all public assistance and other cash relief
payments as well as other household money sources such as veterans
disability or social security benefits be added to the individual's ad-
justed gross income.71 Thus, the household income is defined to in-
dude, for the purposes of rebate computation under the statute, all
the available money a household is likely to receive in a given year.
Since the figure that represents household income in making the rebate
computation is likely to be an accurate gauge of what percentage of
income the household will be able to pay in property taxes, the bene-
fits of the rebate scheme decline as household income increases. (The
greater the household income, the more likely the ability to pay prop-
erty taxes or a portion of them.) It has been repeatedly stated by
Wisconsin tax experts that the statute is aimed only at relieving "in-
ordinately high property tax burdens in relation to . . . household
incomes."72 Inordinately high property tax burdens are considered
"extraordinary," 73 thereby entitling the bearer of the burden to relief.
To determine what portion of a household's property tax is inordi-
nate the statute uses
a system of income constraints. Property taxes become inordinate
if they exceed a certain percentage of household income: These
percentages are increased as household income increases. After
68. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (a) (5) (1969):
5. "Claimant" means a person who has filed a claim under this subsection
and was both domiciled in this state and 65 years of age or over during the
entire calendar year preceding the year in which he files claim for relief under
this subsection.
69. Id.
70. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (a) (3) (1969).
71. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Cook, Quindry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The Wis-
consin Experience, 19 NAT. TAx J. 319, 324 (1966).
73. 1970 ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 15-62-48.
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determining the amount of the tax which is excessive, a percent-
age of this excessive part is relieved.74
The portion of the statute that sets forth the "income constraints"
and outlines the percentage over which "property taxes become inor-
dinate" states:
1. If the household income of the claimant's household was
$1,000 or less in the year to which the claim relates, the claim
shall be limited to 75% of the amount by which the property tax
accrued, or the rent constituting property taxes accrued, or both,
in such year on the claimant's homestead is in excess of 3% of
household income exceeding $500 but not exceeding 21,000.
2. If the household income of the claimant's household was
more than $1,000 .... the claim shall be limited to 60% of the
amount of which the property taxes accrued, or rent constituting
property taxes accrued, or both .... is in excess of 3% of house-
hold income exceeding $500 but not exceeding $1,000, 6% of
household income exceeding $1,000 but not exceeding $1,500, 9%
of household income exceeding $1,500 but not exceeding $2,000,
12% of household income exceeding $2,000 but not exceeding
$2,500 and 15% of all household income over $2,500.7
The effect of this section is to divide eligible claimants into two
groups-households with income of $1,000 or less and those with more
than $1,000 income.76 The former group is entitled to have 75 per
cent of the portion of the property tax deemed inordinate relieved, the
latter group, 60 per cent.77 The relationship of household income to
income constraints is best revealed by the following table:78
Household income Income Constraint
First $500 of income 0
Second $500 .03 (Y-$500)
Third $500 .06 (Y-$1,000)
Fourth $500 .09 (Y-$1,500)
Fifth $500 .12 (Y-$2,000)
Beyond $2,500 .15 (Y-$2,500)
(Y = household income)
74. Humanization of the Property Tax at 358.
75. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.0 9 (7) (g) (1)-(2) (1969).
76. Humanization of the Property Tax at 358.
77. Id.
78. Id. The table in the text has been modified from that in Humanization of
the Property Tax.
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The statute limits to $330 the amount of property tax that can be
used in computing relief.79 Thus, if a household paid $500 in real
property taxes, only $330 could be used for computation.80 To illus-
trate the computation clause, assume a hypothetical owner-occupied
household with $1,700 in income and annual property taxes of $150.
The amount of relief would be:
[$150 - [.00 ($500) + .08 ($500) + .06 ($500) +
.09 ($200) ]] .60
or
[$150 - [$0 + $15 + $80 + $18]] .60 =
$87 X 60 per cent or $52.20
The amount of tax deemed inordinate is $87 and 60 per cent or
$52.20 of this can be relieved. To illustrate the computation where
there is less than $1,000 of income, assume a household with $850 of
income and $150 of taxes:
[$150 - [.00 ($500) + .03 ($50) ]] .75 or
[$150 - [$0 + $10.50]] .75 = $139.50 x 75 per cent or $103.62
The amount of tax deemed inordinate is $139.50 and 75 per cent or
$103.62 of this can be relieved.81
Since, for those households with income over $1,000, the percentage
of constrained income increases for each additional $500 of income,
the result is to create a larger dollar amount to be subtracted from
the total property tax due and thus a smaller amount against which
60 per cent is multiplied to determine inordinate tax burden. This
is another safeguard against taxpayer windfalls.
Perhaps the most unique feature of the Wisconsin statute is that it
reaches elderly renters of property. In the first hypothetical situation
above, assume that the household consisted of an elderly couple with
an annual gross rent of $1,200 ($100 per month). The couple could
consider 25 per cent or $300 of rent as "constituting property taxes
accrued."8 2 In other words, since it is assumed that landlords pass
property taxes on to tenants in the form of higher rents, Wisconsin
has permitted elderly tenants to consider 25 per cent of their annual
79. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (h) (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
80. Humanization of the Property Tax at 358.
81. The sample computations were suggested by similar descriptions and compu-
tations in Humanization of the Property Tax at 358-59.
82. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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rent as the equivalent of property taxes paid for the landlord. For the
hypothetical, if the household were renter-occupied rather than owner-
occupied and income was $1,700 with $800 as the equivalent in prop-
erty taxes paid, the relief would be:
[$300 - [.00 ($500) + .03 ($500) + .06 ($500) +
.09 ($200) ]] .60 or
[$300 - [$0 + $15 + $30 + $18]] .60 =
$237 x 60 per cent or $142.20
The amount of tax deemed inordinate is $237 and 60 per cent or
$142.20 can be relieved.
One study of the Wisconsin statute's effect after one year of opera-
tion revealed that the original provisions were so rigorous that they
would have to be liberalized in order to achieve the purpose of the
legislatureY3 The study showed that it was difficult to qualify as a
claimant, that the computations discouraged many from filing a claim,
and that the computation procedure was so structured that rebates
were in negligible amounts. 84
Another problem with the statute, although not a problem deter-
mined in the study, is that the statute does not include public housing
tenants among potential claimants under the rebate system, even
though federally funded housing projects make a "payment of annual
sums to local authorities in lieu of taxes." 85 This payment comes from
rental receipts derived from the project and approximates "taxes
which would be paid to the State and/or subdivision... upon such
property if it were not exempt from taxation."8 6 Since this payment,
which amounts to ten per cent of the annual shelter costs charged in
the project,8 7 is derived from or based upon rental receipts, it is likely
that the payment is shifted to some extent to the public housing ten-
ants. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that the portion of the
individual tenant's rent that constitutes his proportion of the shifted
payment should be eligible for relief under the rebate scheme. The
test would seem to be whether the percentage of the individual's rent
for a public housing unit that goes to pay for the shifted payment in
lieu of taxes amounts to an inordinate burden. If the whole payment
83. Cook, Quindry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The Wisconsin
Experience, 19 NAT. TAx J. 319, 323-24 (1966).
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1546 (1969).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 1586(c) (5).
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is shifted, then it would seem reasonable to allow for rebate treatment
of that ten per cent passed onto the tenants, just as renters in the
private market are allowed to treat 25 per cent of their annual gross
rent as a basis for tax rebate. However, both the Wisconsin statute's
and the proposed ACIR model act 9 exempt from coverage those eligi-
ble persons already receiving benefits under public housing and other
specified programs.
Even though Wisconsin continued to exclude public housing ten-
ants from those eligible for tax rebates, the statute was liberalized to
some extent in 1966, and by 1968 approximately 70,000 low-income
elderly households were receiving a total of $6.5 million in property
tax relief. 90 Besides accomplishing its original objectives, studies have
shown that the Wisconsin statute has had the beneficial effect of re-
ducing the overall regressivity of the property tax9l and itself has been
equitable in impact, since the taxes of those qualifying for relief have
been reduced by a larger percentage for those in lower income groups
than for those in higher groups.9 2 In dollar terms, the $1,000 to 51,499
claimant class, for example, had an average household income of
$1,259 and paid an average of $199 or 16 per cent of income in prop-
erty taxes before relief.9 3 After relief, they paid an average of 98 in
taxes for a percentage of relief of 51 per cent. 4 The after-relief tax
burden still amounted to 8 per cent, but the overall conclusion is that
the statute "has transformed the regressive property tax into a pro-
portional tax."'s5
A study led by the late Professor Groves, one of the architects of the
Wisconsin statute,98 described the rebate as "negative taxation."'07
88. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (p) (1969) in which it is stated that no
claim for relief can be allowed to anyone who is a recipient under state provisions
pertaining to aid to the blind, county old age assistance, and aid to totally and
permanently disabled persons. See also ACIR STATE LEOISLATIVE PRooRAIu
§ 15-62-48.
89. ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 15-62-48. Section 16 of the model
act states that "no claim for relief under this act shall be allowed to any person
who is a recipient of public funds for the payment of taxes or rent during the
period for which the claim is filed." Id.
90. Humanization of the Property Tax at 358-59.
91. Id. at 360-64.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 361.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 359 & n.7.
97. Cook, Quindry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The Wisconsin Ex-
perience, 19 NAT. TAX J. 318, 320 (1966).
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Since the income of the household rather than the individual is the
ultimate determinant of the rebate and since nearly all household
receipts are aggregated, Groves described the Wisconsin scheme-with
respect to its income aspects-as "welfare rather than tax legislation."98g
In the only court test of the validity of the Wisconsin statute, the
state supreme court in State ex rel. Harvey v. Morgan99 adopted the
Groves characterization of the statute. In upholding the constitution-
ality of the statute in 1966, the court in Harvey held that the statute
was a "relief law in its purpose and in its operation and as such is not
subject to the rule of uniform taxation."'100 Whether other state courts
would adopt precisely that point of view is open to doubt, but there
is, nevertheless, useful language in Harvey for suggesting that expan-
sion of property tax relief to all low-income families along the lines
of the ACIR proposal would have a good chance of being upheld, at
least in Wisconsin.
For a statute pertaining to taxation to be held constitutional under
most state constitutions, it must meet certain requirements of uniform-
it) and equality.'1 These requirements vary from state to state, de-
pending on the exact wording of the particular constitution and the
manner in which it has been interpreted, but the general object is to
assure that similar kinds of property or subjects of taxation are treated
alike in terms of taxability or nontaxability and in terms of the
amount of liability incurred, if taxable.102
Harvey was a suit by a Wisconsin citizen and taxpayer, challenging
the validity of the Wisconsin statute on the following grounds: (1) it
denied equal protection of laws as required by the fourteenth amend-
ment; (2) it did not comply with the state constitutional rule of uni-
formity of taxation. 10 The equal protection argument focused on the
age criterion, which was portrayed as an arbitrary classification "not
germane to the ostensible purpose of the law."'10 The plaintiff con-
tended that the statute discriminated between persons similarly sit-
98. Id. at 322.
99. 30 Wis. 2d 1, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966).
100. Id. at 10, 139 N.W.2d at 589.
101. See generally J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 36-65 (3d ed. 1969).
102. Id.
103. 30 Wis. 2d at 4, 139 N.W.2d at 585-86.
104. Id. at 4, 139 N.W.2d at 586.
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uated and was not uniform because it granted a partial exemption of
property taxes to some persons and not to others.105
In rejecting Harvey's arguments and upholding the validity of the
statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded:
Basically and in fact this is a relief measure, enacted under the
police power of the state. The act takes shelter, a major cost-of-
living item, as a factor upon which relief is predicated. Impor-
tant components of shelter cost are alternatively rent or property
taxes. Additionally, assistance is available only to those elderly
persons on the very verge of poverty ....
This is in no way a property tax law, for if the claimant does
not in fact pay taxes, but instead pays rent, he is still entitled to
relief. His landlord, however, pays taxes on the property occupied
without abatement, since the relief is keyed to the individual and
not to the property. If he does owe property taxes, he is obliged
to pay them in full, and his property tax liability and the amount
collected by the municipality is in no way reduced by this legisla-
tion. In the event relief is granted to the claimant, the payment
is made either as a credit against income taxes, or from an appro-
priation of the state's general fund, whose connection with any
property tax is remote. Property tax receipts and disbursements
are unaffected. The relief granted is to the aged needy and is not
property tax relief.
The administration of this law is in no way related to the collec-
tion of property taxes; rather, the granting of relief is tied in
with the mechanics of the income tax administration. A tax re-
turn must be filed to prove eligibility, but the claimant need not
be an income taxpayer to receive relief from the general fund.
The fact he may receive a rebate of his income taxes is merely a
convenient method of the state meeting its relief obligation under
the act.106
If the property tax relief provided by the Wisconsin statute to the
elderly can be justified as a general relief enactment for a disadvan-
taged segment of the population, expansion of property tax relief to
all low-income groups, regardless of age, would seem equally justifiable
on the same grounds. Certainly, to a considerable extent, the elderly
may be better able to live on a fixed low income than a young fam-
ily'10 7 Young families' expenditures for food, clothing, recreation, and
education may be considerably more than those of the elderly 08
105. d.
106. Id. at 13-14, 139 N.W.2d at 591.
107. Humanization of the Property Tax at 365.
108. Id.
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Additionally, there is a need to save money for retirement and future
education of children on the part of young families.109 Therefore,
expansion of this kind of property tax relief would seem to be justi-
fiable along the same constitutional arguments as were developed in
Harvey.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the approach to property tax relief suggested by the
Wisconsin statute has several important advantages that make it de-
serving of careful consideration. The advantages that have been cited
are:
(1) gives relief only to those in need whether homeowners or
renters; (2) does not involve the local assessment policy in any
way; (3) does not require any local government to increase its
locally determined level of property taxation to compensate for
the revenue that would be lost under an exemption agreement;
(4) provides state appropriations for the relief which are subject
to review and rejustification periodically just as other state ex-
penditures are; (5) recognizes that state and local taxes are all
part of one tax system; and (6) does not violate the tax uni-
formity provisions usually found in state constitutions."10
In the abstract, a careful consideration of these advantages suggests
that this kind of property rebate statute is an attractive way of reliev-
ing the extraordinary portion of the low-income taxpayer's burden.
Certainly extending relief to renters and structuring the rebate so that
it provides the most money to the poorest families is laudable. Addi-
tionally, by allowing the rebate to serve as a credit against the state
income tax, the state can provide for central administration and con-
siderable control over the program. Since the rebate is a form of
indirect housing subsidy, this central administration provides oppor-
tunities to evaluate the system at each step-an advantage not usually
expected in an indirect subsidy program.""' Also operation of the
rebate scheme does nothing to damage the local property tax base,
since the rebate comes from a central fund, the state treasury.
But questions remain. Does the rebate return enough money to
claimants to make it a really effective housing subsidy? Won't land-
109. Id.
I10. Myers, General Appraisal of the Effect of Exemptions on the Tax Base, in
THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 267, 276 (1967).
111. For a discussion of the advantages of indirect versus direct subsidies see
Sengstock & Sengstock, Homeownership: A Goal for All Americans, 46 J. URBAN
L. 317, 503-06 (1967).
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lords simply raise rents again when they know that the tenants are
getting a rebate geared to rent paid for property taxes? What about
the relationship of the rebate to other housing subsidies, including
public housing programs? Unfortunately, the literature leaves a lot of
these questions unanswered, but some tentative conclusions may be
drawn.
Certainly, if the Wisconsin experience is any indicator, unless the
computations are greatly liberalized in terms of what is includable in
income and what percentages are used, the rebate is not likely to be
more than a token subsidy.1 2 Unless this liberalization occurs as it
did in Wisconsin, the average rebate for those in the lower-income
brackets probably will remain well below $100." 3 But if the subsidy
could be raised on an average to about $150-$200, it would help. A
$200 rebate would enable a low-income family to purchase an average
of $17 more per month in terms of housing. This could mean the
difference in, for example, renting a four-room apartment rather than
a three-room dwelling."1 4 For an elderly couple, it could mean a sav-
ings on housing costs averaging $17 a month. Such an amount of
money is not likely to be of much help to a totally destitute family,
but for a family with a stable breadwinner who makes a steady albeit
low income, a $200 rebate could be a real stimulus. Of course, that
amount may not be the deciding factor as to whether a family makes
the "major shift" that Netzer sees as occurring when a family goes
from rental to owner-occupied housing."
As for landlords' further shifting taxes onto renters once a rebate
system is in operation, the outlook is mixed, but there is reason to
believe that this would not happen. The literature on forward shift-
ing of taxes from property owners to tenants is complicated, and as
one observer notes, the conventional theory that such a shift occurs
has been accepted without a great deal of empirical research on its
validity. 1 6 A study of 31 communities in the Boston area suggests that
112. Id. See also Cook, Quindry, & Groves, Old Aged Homestead Relief-The
Wisconsin Experience, 19 NAT. TAx J. 319, 322 (1966).
113. Id.
114. NETZER-DouLAS COMm'N RPr. at 19.
115. EcoNoMICs OF THE PROPERTY TAX at 73-74.
116. Orr, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing, 21
NAT. TAX J. 253, 254 (1968).
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the conventional theory does not always operate, although a recent
re-examination questions some of the premises of the Boston study.117
More dangerous than tax shifting is the inflationary effect on the
housing market that the rebate could have if not accompanied by an
increase in housing units available. Without the availability of addi-
tional housing units in the central city, the poor who receive rebates
simply would have more money to spend on the same housing. Such
a situation would be a windfall for landlords who could raise rents
and, if tenants vacated, be assured that there would be a better tenant
market than there would have been without the rebate.
Another economic effect that the rebate might have is in the area of
capitalization of taxes into the value of land. According to economists,
the tax capitalization theory holds that taxes imposed on income-
producing properties are offset by a compensatory reduction in the
price for which these properties are exchanged.113 Therefore, if taxes
for homeowners are eased by means of the rebate, the drop in taxes
would seem to call for a rise in property prices. But, as in the case of
forward shifting of taxes to tenants, empirical evidence on this theory
is scarce, and the proof lies more in theoretical reasoning." 9 But even
if the theory is valid, the final determination of the impact of tax cap-
italization would depend on the demand and supply of housing at the
time a rebate statute is implemented.
Finally, the rebate scheme under consideration raises serious ques-
tions concerning its relationship with public housing. To allow public
housing tenants to become eligible for the rebate no doubt amounts
to a double subsidy for them, since they are already receiving the
benefit of living in subsidized housing. And, as discussed earlier, such
a double subsidy would seem to be contrary to the intent of the Wis-
consin statute as it now stands' 20 as well as the proposed ACIR model
act.'-' Yet, if the rebate is not going to be available to those already
117. Id. Orr's thesis was recently challenged in Heinberg & Oates, The Inci-
dence of Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing: A Comment and Some
Further Evidence, 23 NAT. TAx J. 92 (1970). Orr replied to the challenge in
Orr, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes: A Response, 23 NAT. TAx J.
99 (1970).
118. See Woodard & Brady, Inductive Evidence of Tax Capitalization, 18 NAT.
TAX J. 193 (1965).
119. Id.
120. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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receiving some other form of direct housing subsidy, it is likely to miss
a large number of otherwise needy persons upon whom the real prop-
erty tax burden or its equivalent 22 may be equally great. The result
of avoiding double subsidies may be to so limit the number of bene-
ficiaries that the added costs of administration, no matter how effi-
ciently centralized, may not be justified. Of course, as in any other
form of public assistance, the difficulty with the rebate scheme is where
to draw the line, but if the line is drawn too tightly, the overall object
of the program may be vitiated.
Obviously, then, all of the problems implicit in a property tax re-
bate scheme have not been worked out. Perhaps more study of the
Wisconsin experience, especially with respect to tax shifting, capital-
ization, and double subsidies, will reveal ways to solve the problems
raised here. As it now stands the rebate idea seems to be a good one
if the actual amount of money credited or returned to the taxpayer is
sufficiently large to be an effective indirect subsidy and if the number
of potential recipients is not arbitrarily or unthinkingly limited.
122. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1972/iss1/11
CASE COMMENTS
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1972/iss1/11
